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Although the quantitative impo~tance of the mineral
resources of Africa is generally appreciated, the economic
and political consequences of those resources have been in-
adequately treated in both the scholarly and the more public
press. To whom are the mineral resources of Africa important?
Hot'1 is the exploitation of these minerals controlled? Has the
"African revolution'r or the "winds of changer. affected the
in-:l\J.stry? t.lhat are the prospects for the future?
The minerals of Africa may, in a very real sense, be
more important to Europe and other industrial areas of the
world than they are to Africa. Africans cannot themselves eat
th,~ ores, nor do they have the industrial systems that ingest
mi.lerals . For Europe, as for other dev&loped industrial systems ,
nlitlerals have become as nece-ssary as is food for organic systems.
The Africans, byand large, participate only in the extraction
of the ores, ~lhich are then shipped out of the African
sphere. liThe companyll, a social institution through which
va~t undertakings can be organized) gets paid for the
mineral product, and out of those earnings, the African miner is
paid a wage and the African state a small share through taxes
or royalties. The African miner buys such necessities as food
and clothing with his wage, the African state with its share
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buys such things as means of administ~ation and of transporta-
tion, largely in and out of the mining regions. The company
uses its remaining profits to pay dividends to shareholders,
regularly outside of Africa, and to invest in capital
equipment for further mining undertakings so that the greatly
increased world demand for minerals to feed industrial systems
can be met
In these ways the African mining industry has been
developed to produce significant portions of the ores needed
for European industryJ even ,~hile Africa in general remains
"underdeveloped", and in fact i'.fricans living in pro){irnity
to richly endowed mines remain in poverty. t.fric.an mines
produce 23% of the antimony of the world, 6% (and soon more)
of the bauxite, 31% of the chromium ore. 22% of the copper ore,
90% of the diamonds, 67% of the gold, 28% of the maneanese,
28% of the phosphate rock, 11% of the tin concentrates, 15% of
the uranium, 29% of the vanadium ore, and 7% of the zinc ore
of the world. (u. s. Dept. of Commerce. Overseas Business
Rep2rts, August. 1966.) Contrast these figures with Africa's
percentage of the worJ.d's supply of other valuables--people
automobiles, telephones, education, physicians--to fully
appreciate hOT~ little Africans get from the industrial
countries in :return for what the African mining industry
yields up
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1'lisled perhaps by two very special t illusory cases t
South Africa and the Congo, some students of African develop-
ment have overemphasized the spin-off effect of mining enter-
prises. The fairly spectacular gro,1th of these two systems to
which mining is central is probably more explained by the manner
in t1hich each government could manipulate the labor supply (each
in its Own way) so aD to foster investment and reinvestment than
it is to any intrinsic property 0£ mining enterprises. In the
Congo, t'7here under the Delgians the economy tJas gro~ling by
25% per year) the cost of labor t~as deliberately kept lo~~.
and profits 0£ the companies high, by forcing the population to
produce foods and fibers, necessities for maintaining the
population. In South Africa the cost of labor is kept lo~~ by
direct and indirect government control of the labor supply for
mining itself. Whereas in many countries gold production has
virtually ceased because the price remains stable ~~hile costs
rise, in South Africa, t~here a miner is paid something less
than the minimum judged necessary to keep a family in health.
1966 gold production is 181% of the rate in 1957. Reaching
this rate, ho~.lever, requires more than mere cheap labor; it
also requires investment of capital, for despite the depressed
wage costs other gold-mining costs have risen, at more than 3%
per annum (in fact, 1966 costs are 6% over those of 1965) From
an African point of Vie\1, such heavy investments of capital might
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better be made in another industry, one with greater relevance
to economic production for Africans. In South Africa currentlyt
such reinvestment and growth in mining for other minerals is also
occurring. The 1966 rate.of production of iron is 4CO% that of
1957t the copper rate -354% of 1957t manganese -24~~t diamonds
254%. (Financial Times and Industrial Press, Feb. 1967.)
These increasest tOOt require enormous investment of capital,
and have very slight bearing on the general economic or social
development of the country. (An informative analysis demonstra-
ting the lack of congruence bet~Jeen mining development and
general social and economic development, dra\~ing data largely
from Latin America. is a study by Glaucio Soares. Economic
Development ~ Politi.cal Radical~sm, Doctoral Dissertation,
Washington University, St. Louis, 1965.)
For the long term, it should be recalled that extrac-
tive industries do extract, and leave an emptiness ~~here they
have extracted. Gaping holes, piles of tailings of little or
absolutely no use. these are anticipated Some ofprospects.
the damage they do may lie hidden, unexplored. In their
intensity to exploit the lands of Africa and remove her ores to
Europe, Some clelicate natural ecological balances may well be
disturbed. The llancro.f"t copper mine in Zambia can be worked
only by contj.nually pumping out water--not a little water,
but 65 million gallons a day! Can this be done, can the water
table be thus lo~17ered) without affecting other natural things
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in that environment? i~re the planners of Zambian development
weighing all factors in such exploitation ~lhich has very small
direct feedbaclt into the non-mining economy? The first
beneficiaries of Zambia's Copperbelt are most certainly those
Anglo-American Corporation ofthat control the industry:
South Africa and American Metal Climax
If the mining industry is to contribute to the develop-
ment of other sectors of an econonly or other aspects of a society.
profits must be taken out of mining and put in some,~here else.
Neither the "taking out'l nor the "putting in" are likely to
Such actions must be deliberately taken.occur by chance
Through deliberate generosity, some fa~,ilies or foundations
(Oppenheimer, Guggenheim, Phelps-Stol<es, African-American
Institute) may "voluntarily" distri'1)ute some of the profits
from mining. They may put something into education, into an
agricultural demonstration project, or into the training of
social worl(ers, but they will not talte money out of mining
and invest it in an adequate way in the basic development of
the whole local economy. E~7en with monopoly control, as
exhibited in the diamond industry, the controllers put excess
profits into developing their Otvn enterprises, such as the
manufacture of synthetic diamonds (in Europe) , rather than
into an industry that b;ght illso benefit Africans oaridoledd
Thus far, in Africa,to general African economic development.
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other; sectors of economics have been reilked for the benefit of
the mining industry more than the mining industry has been used
to generate solid growth. (For an illustration of this, see
the author's "Capital and the Congol', in Southern Africa .!..!!
New York,Transition, edited by James Daker and John Davis.
1966.)
In this perspective it is proper to say that Africa and
other "underdeveloped" areas are being exploited--more now,
perhaps, than in the past, for ~~e are told constantly of the
~~idenj-ng gap between the rich nations and the poor .
The reasons for this state of a£fairs--the exploitation
of rich, Africa~. resources and yet the widening of the gap--are
not to be sought merely in the depredations of colonialisrn--
IlpaleocolonialismlJ, if you will--nor simply in the connivance of
"neo-imperialist'l financiers and industrialists bent on
enslaving the ~7orld on the South African model. Some of the
causes lie in certain historically derived peculiarities of
the world economy: The relative prices of ra~l materials versus
~~nufactured goods, the status in the market of what the poor
nations need relative to 'v hat the poor nations control, the
fact that sOme items in the situation are indeed subject to
'-1orld marl,et conditions t-1hile others are not . Africa will not
achieve economic independence until they can truly bargain, not
beg, in the \~orld n~rketplace. This means that unless changes
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action
country.
large.
a t~orld-\~ide basis .
on the world market. Local prodtJlcer countries with no control
labor supply.
entrepeneurial talents and of capital equipment increase
pressure is great to reduce wages or numbers of unskilled
t17orkers or to reduce the royaltiel; or taxes on the extracted
minerals just to keep the plant in operation.
Whether the
government or some foreign company owns the plant is not the
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crucial criterion; the fact that access to the ore and unskilled
labor are alone not subject to direct vlorld market conditions is
the governing factor.
The Government of Ghana can no more afford to operate a
gold mine at a loss than can Consolidated Gold Fields of
South Africa. But the South African Government keeps the mines
open, even though the ~vorld price of gold is relatively lo~~, by
keeping mine wages lo~v; in Ghana, by contrast, several mines
closed.
What is the meaning of a I'price" in the ~vorld marl<et?
The United States ~{orks diligently on the ~'lorld market to keep
the price of gold as lo~J as it is; but, on the other hand, it is
the international political decision to use gold to balance
international pa~ents that keeps the price of gold as high as
it is. It is well to remember that ""lorld market price" is not
a "natural price" . Prices in any situation are an emergent from
human interaction. Most vlorld prices are manipulated one way or
another, but this is accomplished only by those with power, and
power is increased by units working in conjunction ~1ith one
another. The African states have been unable thus far to
cooperate enough to have much effect. The mining companies have
done better at this.
The gold-producing companies of South Airica are so
,~ell-organized, for both internal cooperation and external
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aolidarity that they alone prOd\ICe almost three-quarters of all
the gold produced in the ~'lorld. Through C. vJ. Enge Ihard , an
American citizen ~~ho serves on South Africa's quasi-official
Chamber of Mines, but a Ne~.' Jer~;ey supporter of the Great Society,
the gold mining companies of SOllth .\frica influence the
United States Government. They managed a contract under which
the United States Atomic Energy Commission guaranteed loans for
$100 million by the American Export-Import Bank so that the
Gold Mining Companies might tool up to produce uranium, which
the United States and the United Kingdom bought, during the ten
years, 1957-1967, at a rate some four times higher than American
producers were being paid. Price is what can be managed
The diamond industry is even better organized, and again
tends to focus on South Africa. Cartel arrangements have been
effective in maintaining very high diamond prices. The price
of gems is raised as much as ten per cent at one time by the
Central Selling Organization; still, the cartel has managed to
control most producers and thus to control the market to their
own benefit. An event such as the United States government
announcing in 1965 the purchase of $30 million worth
of diamonds in the Congo, ,~here all relevant companies,
Forminiere) Interfor, Miba, and :Sibeka, seem firmly tied in with
the Oppenheimer-managed cartel i:s inexplicable. (For many details
on the organization of mining companies in Africa, the reader is referred
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to K",ame Nkrurnah's Neo-Colonialjlsm. The Last Stage of Imperialism,
(New York, 1966) and, for a more analytic ap,proach, to the
author's "The African Mineral Industry: Evolution of a
Supranational Level of Integratj.on," Social Problems (Fall,
1963).)
Consider copper, an important metal widely used and
widely found over the eerth, but: gro~.'ing scarcer as demand
increases. Copper-producing conlpanies allover the ~'1orld, but
particularly those in Africa, maintain fairly close connections
t-lith one another so that the productj.on and marlteting of copper
The goal iscan be organized in their o~'1n long term interest.
to minimize fluctuations in price and in production so that the
whole copper industry is efficie~nt and profitable. Price
control as such is precluded because of the large numbers of
producers but also because of th,e competition from other metals
such as aluminum, ~yhich vlould make it un~'1ise to drive copper
prices up very high. In fact, in 1966, with strikes and the
shortage of coal in Zambia interfering with production in the
face of greatly increased demands, copper producers tried hard
to supply users without raising prices for fear that if they
,gere not supplied they would turn to aluminuJii1, and stay ,"ith
aluminum, to the long term detriment of the 'copper ind~..try.
In 1967 concern was sho~'1n over the dispute b,et~'1een the Congo
Government and Union Mini~re or Soci~t~ Ge.n~rale de Belgique,
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for all copper producers lose, p,otentially, 't'lhen interruptions
in delivery, such as might have been caused by Congo's prohibiting
exports, make industrial manufacturers consilder moving from
copper to aluminum.
The point to be made here is that th,~ companies are
organized, at least loosely, in a net~}ork of overlapping groups
so that even though a company may compete di'rectly v1ith
another at one level, their higher-level "sulpranational"
organization emphasizes their co1mmon interes1ts.
The African states, ~vealt as they are individually, have
not methodically utilized what r,esources the~, have for enhancing
their collective influence vis-a-vis the devE~loped industrial
systems. Individual attempts at nationaliza1:ion have no effect
on the rate of exchange between "1hat the developing country has
to give and ~.,hat the developing c:ountry needf; . Collective
action, aiming at control of a s'ignificant pl:oportion of the
resource--say copper and its sub~;titutes such as aluminum-
could force the industrial systems to pay more for what they
use. Such action, if successful :, could begin to close the gap
If the United States can manipul~lte the pricE: of gold, if a
company cartel can manipulate the price of diamonds, why should
not an CAll or ECA or OCAM unitin~~ Congo (Kinshasa), Zambia
Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville), Mauretania, Guinea, South West Africa,
Zimbab\;7e, Uganda, and Cameroun manipulate the price of copper
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and aluminum (and their substitll!.tes) . Collectively, they could
get a higher price on the ~'1orld market for ~lhat they ha-ve to sell
In the ten years during which so marly t.frican states
achieved independence, 1957 to :l967, these ne~'l states have
tended to bargain individually, not collectively, in their
dealings ~1ith companies in the l1~ining industry. It might not
be valid to say that the A:;:rican "lost" each encounter, but
their resources, they might have: struclt better bargains . Both
and each African country has been dealing quite independently
~lith various companies, bargaining, thus, not from the strongest
possible pos~tion. Zambia purchased back from the British
profited enormously for forty years. Perhap:3 the price '-1as
not dear, but some legal experts believed thj~ Company's rights
would not have been valid if tested against :international law
Should Zambia, with all its need:s, have paid the British
South Africa Company anything mo:re, beyond aJLl the royalties
collected?
The Congo Government's rE~cent attempt: to reassert
greater control over the mining jLndustry extQLblished in Congo
might have been more successful jLf it had had. support from other
African states. As it happened. the companies apparently held
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their ground, established at thE~ supranational level, all of
them refusing to deal ~-1itll the c:ompany established by the Congo
government so long as the Soci~t:~ G~n~rale de Belgique and
Union Mini~re (of Belgium) remained unsatisfied. A consortium
composed of the Belgian Banque lan1bert, the French Penarroya
Company, and the American Ne~,nnO[1lt Mining Company, presumably
organized to acquire L~O% interest in the government-controlled
company which ~'las to replace Union Mini~re. reportedly refused
to buy any shares at all unless the Congo government indemnified
Union Mini~re. Without any such staunch allies among its fellovl
J:lfrican states, the Congo government '-1as forced to accept an
agreement that returns essentially to the et.!ltus quo ante,
except that instead of Union Mini~re, simply, there ~.lill be the
Gt!!nt!!rale Congolaise des l-1inerais adrrinistered by Socit!!t~ G~nt!!rale
des Minerais.
In its negotiations with Union Mini~.re and its allies
the Congo had. it seems. the counsel of Theodore Sorensen,
formerly assistant to the late President Kennedy. Zambia has
also used expatriate counsellors in its relaltions ~'1ith the mining
industry. Probably most African states have done so.
That approach, using forleign expert advisers, is
inherently weak in that their colL1nsel is likE~ly to be limited
to the purely technical (in eitrx! r law, or e<;onomics, or
engineering) and conceived in th4~ context of status quo; the
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basic problems, hotvever, are surely political, and the context
of ,,\.Crican decision making should be one ori,ented to'vard a future
t~orld system quite different from today's
The inappropriateness of the advice of politically
sterile technicians is clear in reports by t4~arns of experts
from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(the so-called "Norld Bank") and from the Un:ited Nations
Economic Commission for Africa. For example, theyadvised
Tanzania and Zambia against bui1ding the Tan:~am rail link on
the technical grounds that it ~las not econom:lcal, apparently
utterly oblivious to the crucial role such a railway to the
Indian Ocean t1ould play in the fight against racifm and
colonialism in Southern Africa. I t mus t havE~ been obvious even
to those Ilpure'l experts, that sut:h a rail link would have
strengthened Zambia, Tanzania, C.:>ngo, and alJL Africans,
vis-a-vis the oppressing Rhodesi.lns, PortuguE~se, and South
Africans. It t'lould have strengthened them, t:oo, vis-a-vis
the private investors such as Tanganyika Conc:essions, Ltd
who have interest not only in .1ml?Ortant mines, such as Union
Minibre's in Congot but also in 1the so-import:ant Benguela Rail~i]ay
through Portuguese Angola. Had 1the African ~;tates acted with
unity--in ~",hich there is strength--they might: have called in
the economists and said, in effec:t, we have clecided to build a
railroad, sho~'1 us that it ~7ill b,~ economical].y feasible so
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that ,~e can raise the capital to do it.
The first requisite o:E "the revollltion in Africa" must
be that poor countries combinE~ to get a greater share of the
]~or lithe t'lOr\;:ersil or lithe peasants"products of world industry.
or lIthe military.1 to overthro~rl a local elj.te accomplishes
nothing in itself.
